Research on Common-Mode and Dependent (CMD) Outage Events in Power Systems: A Review by Papic, Milorad et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research on Common-Mode and Dependent (CMD) Outage
Events in Power Systems: A Review
Citation for published version:
Papic, M, Agarwal, S, Allan, RN, Billinton, R, Dent, C, Ekisheva, S, Gent, D, Jiang, K, Li, W, Mitra, J, Pitto,
A, Schneider, A, Singh, C, Vadlamudi, VV & Varghese, M 2017, 'Research on Common-Mode and
Dependent (CMD) Outage Events in Power Systems: A Review' IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol.
32, no. 2, pp. 1528-1536. DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2016.2588881
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1109/TPWRS.2016.2588881
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 1 
 
Abstract—The purpose of this paper is to present a review of some 
fundamental concepts and practical applications in the area of 
common-mode and dependent (CMD) outage events in power sys-
tems. The paper is a result of ongoing activity carried out by the 
Probability Applications for Common and dependent Mode 
Events (PACME) Working Group (WG) of the Reliability, Risk 
and Probability Applications (RRPA) Subcommittee. The 
PACME Working Group was formed in 2010 to review, advance 
and present the research and practical applications in the area of 
CMD outage events. The paper presents state-of-the-art in re-
search, modeling and applications of CMD outage events in power 
system planning and operation. Issues considered include: data 
monitoring and collection, and probabilistic modeling and evalua-
tion in the planning and operation of power generation and trans-
mission systems. Additionally, some results obtained from outage 
data statistics corresponding to CMD outage events in systems 
such as GADS, TADS, and CEA are presented. 
 
Index Terms— Bulk power systems, CEA, common-mode and de-
pendent outage events, failures, GADS, outage data, TADS, transmis-
sion system reliability. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 Maintaining an adequate level of reliability in the planning 
and operation of the power system is a fundamental aspect of 
an electric utility’s strategy. The advantages of probabilistic 
techniques over deterministic approaches (e.g. withstanding a 
single outage or N-1) in reliability studies have been recognized 
[1]-[6]. The primary assumption in early probabilistic studies 
was that component outages were random events occurring in-
dependently [1]. This assumption simplified the calculation 
process, but is unwarranted in many practical cases. Previous 
studies and studies undertaken by several Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Task Forces and Working 
Groups (WG) show that common-mode and dependent (CMD) 
outage events can significantly reduce power system reliability 
[7]-[13]. 
Papers published by PACME WG present a review the fun-
damental concepts in modeling CMD outages [7]-[10]. They in-
dicate that considerable activity has taken place in many parts 
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of the world in creating rigorous reliability models and evalua-
tion techniques that are capable of dealing with CMD failure 
events. These papers also show that accurate analysis of CMD 
outage events in reliability evaluation requires proper definition 
and mathematical modeling of such events. The underlying 
concepts of these models and techniques reflect the various phi-
losophies, policies, and operational constraints of different util-
ities. Several mathematical models that rigorously consider 
CMD outage events are available, but most data collection pro-
cedures are inadequate to calculate the performance indices 
needed to forecast the impact of such events [7].  
Reference [11] shows that most of the current methods of 
calculating a generation system loss of load probability (LOLP) 
assume generator-forced outages are independent; i.e., the 
forced outages of a unit are not related to those of other units. 
Some outages of generating units, however, are not independent 
events, the proportion depending on issues of plant configura-
tion to be discussed later [11]. In addition, the rate and duration 
of forced outages are function of generator utilization and 
maintenance effort. 
Modeling protection system failures and misoperations that 
in most cases result in dependent outage events is an important 
topic that has been studied in the past [14]-[16]. Advanced con-
trol technologies create even more complex modes of failure 
which may outage multiple units. Integration of variable energy 
sources into power system presents further difficulties and chal-
lenges in data classification and modeling of CMD [17]-[18]. 
This paper presents the results of ongoing research carried 
out by the PACME WG of the RRPA Subcommittee. The goal 
of this paper is to provide a review on issues related to the CMD 
outage data monitoring and collection, probabilistic modeling 
and evaluation, and their application in the planning and opera-
tion of electric power systems.  
The paper aims to 1) review and discuss basic definitions of 
CMD outage events, 2) review major causes of CMD events, 3) 
review the development of models and methods considering 
CMD events, 4) calculate representative indices of CMD outage 
events from the major North American  outage databases, and 
5) present challenges in modeling and assessing the impact of 
CMD events on the performance of power systems.  
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II. DEFINITIONS AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF CMD 
EVENTS  
Basic terminology and definitions of independent, common-
mode and dependent outage events used in this paper are those 
defined in IEEE Standards [19]-[20] and the North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Transmission Availa-
bility Data System (TADS) [21]. 
A. Common-Mode Outages 
A detailed list of illustrative examples for common-mode 
outages is provided in previous WG papers [8], [10]. The pres-
ence of a single “actor” is the principal distinction from depend-
ent or cascading outage events. 
B. Dependent Outages 
 A dependent outage or outages may result from a number  
factors, such as failure of equipment, malfunctioning of protec-
tive devices, weather conditions, natural disasters, loading con-
ditions, power transfers, maintenance, human error, etc. Usu-
ally, an initiating event for a dependent outage propagates via 
different mechanisms beyond the initial outage to multiple out-
ages, which sometimes result in cascading failures [7], [10]. As-
sessing the conditional probability of such dependent events has 
always been a challenge for utility planning and operation de-
partments. Reference [21] lists the following five categories of 
cause codes that could potentially result in a dependent outage 
event. 
1) Failed AC Substation Equipment: Failed alternating 
current (AC) substation equipment failures, most commonly a 
stuck circuit breaker often results in dependent outages. The 
TADS manual defines this category as a failure of substation 
equipment ‘inside the substation fence,’ including transformers 
and circuit breakers but excluding protection system equipment 
[21]. 
2) Failed Protection System Equipment:Protection system 
failures and misoperations often result in dependent outages. As 
the name implies, the TADS manual defines this category as the 
failure of protection system equipment including any relay 
and/or control misoperations [21]. 
3) Human Error:Human error can, in some situations, 
cause dependent outages. The TADS manual defines these as 
outages caused by any incorrect action traceable to employees 
and/or contractors operating, maintaining, and/or providing 
assistance to the transmission owner [21]. An example would 
be a relay setting error. 
4) Power System Condition:Power system conditions such 
as instability, overload trip, out-of-step, abnormal voltage, or 
abnormal frequency can also cause dependent outages [21]. 
5) Weather-Related Outages:Weather-related outages can 
cause dependent outage events in a power system. They are de-
fined in TADS manual  as outages caused by weather, such as 
snow, extreme temperature, rain, hail, fog, sleet/ice, wind (in-
cluding galloping conductor), tornado, microburst, dust storm, 
and flying debris caused by wind [21]. 
III. MODELS AND METHODS REVIEW  
The creation of models and methods and the evolution of data 
collection and reporting are two complementary aspects that 
need to be adequately addressed in the development process [8].  
A. Basic Component Models 
The basic component model in power system reliability stud-
ies is the two-state representation in which a component is ei-
ther in the operable (up) state or an inoperable (down) state, and 
failure and restoration rates are constant [1]-[7]. Including ac-
tive and passive failures of components that participate in 
switching actions of the station involves a three-state model to 
enhance the basic two-state representation [22]. 
B. Common-Mode Models and Methods Reviews 
Traditionally, common-mode outages are regarded as im-
probable events. Although the frequency of common-mode fail-
ures may an order of magnitude less than that of independent 
outages, the probability of system failure can dramatically in-
crease by including the possibility of common-mode outages 
into consideration. 
A Task Force of the Application of the Probability Methods 
(APM) Subcommittee proposed the definition and a model of 
common-mode forced outages of overhead transmission cir-
cuits in [8], which was later modified by introducing a com-
mon-cause repair for the common-cause failure [23]-[27].  
C. Dependent Models and Methods Reviews 
A state transition diagram of a two-component system con-
sidering independent, dependent mode, and dependent mode in-
itiating outages is presented in Fig. 1 [28].  
The effect of various types of dependent outages on compo-
site system reliability performance is presented in [29]-[37]. 
Reference [34] considers dependent outages in a security-con-
strained adequacy evaluation of composite systems. 
1) Environment-Related Outages: Early models of trans-
mission circuits recognized that during stormy periods, envi-
ronmental conditions may increase the failure rates to a much 
higher level than during normal weather [3]. Reference [4] 
uses the Markov approach to model components exposed to a 
fluctuating environment and presents a thorough analysis of 
various degrees of failure occurring during stormy weather. It 
was noted that in adverse weather, even if failures are inde-
pendent conditional on the weather background, failure bunch-
ing may occur due to the increased failure rate leading to a 
higher probability of overlapping failures. A  complete set of 
equations for calculating the reliability indices for parallel 
transmission circuits exposed to a fluctuating environment are 
given in [4], [25]. Modeling extreme (as opposed to adverse) 
weather in power system reliability evaluation is presented in 
[24]-[32]. Reference [17] describes a coherent framework and 
a methodology, developed during the European research pro-
ject AFTER (2011-2014) [33], to characterize weather events 
(like storms) in terms of probability distributions of stress var-
iables (such as wind or precipitation rate) over different time 
intervals (from few minutes to hours). 
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Fig. 1. State transition diagram of a 2-component system considering independ-
ent, dependent mode and dependent mode initiating outages  
2) outages is presented in [7]. Models of substation-related 
outages that have been used in the reliability analysis of com-
posite power systems are presented in [34]-[36]. 
3) Protection Failures and Misoperations: Protection fail-
ures and misoperations, including hidden failures, are another 
important source of dependent outages [14]-[18]. The im-
portance of modeling the mechanism of protection failures 
and how those models have been used in the reliability of com-
posite power systems is shown in [38]-[42].  
4) Failures of Cyber Devices and Cyber Attacks: Prior to 
the 1970s power system protection and control devices were 
generally associated with a single transmission element and 
circuit breakers interfacing it to other adjacent elements. The 
introduction of distributed computer devices communicating 
through non-dedicated phone and later, internet communica-
tions created the possibility of very complex interactions 
among the sub-systems used for control, communication, pro-
tection and defense, and they span a broad range of time 
frames and cover wide interconnected areas. As a result, sys-
tem operation is becoming more and more dependent on the 
dependability and security of information and communication 
technology (ICT) systems. Possible malfunctions in protection 
control and communication systems may greatly affect the re-
sponse of the power system to disturbances. Therefore, model-
ing and evaluating interdependencies on ICT systems becomes 
very important, as noted in recent publications [43]-[45].  
5) Multiple n-k Outages: Considerable work on identifying 
n-k outages that are the result of one or more of the listed 
above sources of CMD events has been published [46]. Refer-
ence [46] examines and addresses the issue of identifying, 
modeling, and assessing the impacts of multiple n-k outages. 
6) Cascading Failures: Cascading failures are a special 
category of dependent events that can result in widespread 
electric-service interruptions that cannot be restrained from se-
quentially spreading beyond an area predetermined by studies 
[47]. The growing interest in analyzing high-impact, low-
probability events together with the increasing availability of 
data coming from on-line monitoring systems are two im-
portant drivers for the recent developments of probabilistic 
risk-based approaches [17].  
IV. OUTAGE DATA REPORTING AND ANALYSIS 
Reference [10] presents an overview of outage data collec-
tion systems in North America and Europe. Much of the data 
pertaining to outage events in the USA is available from the 
Generating Availability Data System (GADS) [48]-[49] and the 
TADS maintained by NERC [21]. Generation data collection 
under GADS dates began in 1982, but nationwide transmission 
outage data collection under TADS began only in 2008. Prior 
to this, there was no uniform practice in transmission outage 
data collection across the U.S. Canadian utilities have had con-
sistent transmission data collection practices for many decades, 
and this data is available on the Canadian Electrical Association 
(CEA) website [50]. 
Recent publications present representative indices for CMD 
outages [10], [51]-[52].  
The WG paper [10] presents transmission CMD indices for 
circuits and transformers. Subsequent subsections show the re-
sults of CMD indices for transmission and generation. 
A. Transmission 
Basic common-mode and dependent indices for AC circuits 
and transformers calculated from TADS (nationwide) outage 
data for 2008-2014 are presented in Table I. 
Basic common-mode and dependent indices for AC circuits 
and transformers calculated from WECC TRD (western US and 
Canada) outage data for 2008-2014 are presented in Table II. 
Comparing the indices calculated from these two databases 
indicates the following: 
 The frequency of common mode outages of transmis-
sion circuits is about the same in NERC TADS and 
WECC TRD but the average duration is much higher 
in TADS than in TRD. It should be noted that very few 
lines in the 600-799 kV class are on common towers 
with another line, the most common relationship for 
lines experiencing a common mode outage. WECC 
has neither ac lines nor transformers in this class. 
 The frequency of common mode outages of transform-
ers is about twice as high in TRD for voltage classes 
200-299 kV and 400-599 kV and the average duration 
for voltage class 400-599 kV is significantly higher in 
TADS than in TRD. 
 Results for dependent mode outages of transmission 
circuits from NERC TADS and WECC TRD in Tables 
I and II show that the frequency index is about the 
same, but the average duration is higher in TADS than 
in TRD.  
 Results for dependent mode outages of transformers 
from NERC TADS and WECC TRD in Tables I and 
II show that the frequency index is about the same, but 
the average duration for voltage classes 300–399 and 
400–599 kV is significantly less in TRD than in 
TADS. 
Basic common-mode indices for transmission circuits and 
transformers, as well as for circuit breakers and terminals, cal-
culated from outage data in the CEA Equipment Reliability In-
formation System (ERIS) from 2008 to 2014 are presented in 
Table III. Data for voltage classes under 200 kV has been omit-
ted. Because CEA data is calculated on components rather than 
the complete ac circuit or transformer bank, it is not directly 
comparable to that shown in Tables I and II for TADS and TRD. 
Benchmark results from the three databases - TADS, TRD 
and CEA – are shown for the average duration of common 
mode outages for transmission lines and transformers. Fig. 2 
presents the average duration for common-mode outages for 
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transmission lines and transformers calculated from TADS, 
TRD, and CEA. 
B. Generation 
Compared to transmission outages, outages on the generation 
side have some different features. In general, they are more 
complex than transmission outages from the perspective of their 
causes. This is because a generating unit has more elements lo-
cated in a limited space (i.e., power plant) with many moving 
or dynamic parts. With regard to the CMD outages, the genera-
tion facilities have both internal and external outage events ac-
cording to the location of the causes.  
 
 
TABLE I 
TADS Common-Mode and Dependent Mode Indices 
 
 
*Note: The unit for transmission AC circuits is per hundred miles per year, and 
for transformers is per element per year. 
 
TABLE II 
WECC TRD Common-Mode and Dependent Mode Indices 
 
*Note: The unit for transmission AC circuits is per hundred miles per year, and 
for transformers is per element per year. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Average Duration of Common-Mode Outages for Transmission Lines 
and Transformers Calculated from Outage Data in TADS, TRD, and CEA 
TABLE III 
CEA ERIS Common-Mode Indices 
 
 
***Note: The unit for transmission AC circuits is per hundred miles per year, 
and for other elements is per element per year. 
 
C.  
 
The internal CMD outage events are those for which the 
cause of a generator outage was within the same plant. Such 
outage events are largely related to failures of elements provid-
ing shared service in the plant. Units under 100 MW, for which 
shared facilities offer significant economies, are more common 
for hydro and gas turbine units than for fossil, combined cycle 
or nuclear units. Typical shared components in current plants 
include step-up transformers or GSUs, fuel handling systems, 
and dam and gates in hydro plants. In the past common header 
steam supplies feeding several small generators created similar 
vulnerabilities. 
External CMD outage events are referred to generator out-
ages that are related to causes outside the plant. These types of 
outage event are usually out of management control of the 
power plant. Some typical examples are failures of the trans-
mission lines, which connect the plant for power delivery; the 
problems of gas supply pipelines, which are not the property of 
the power plant; and the natural catastrophes, which are usually 
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due to extreme weather conditions, such as tornadoes, hurri-
canes, and floods. 
Unlike a transmission line being simply reported as on out-
age, a generator can have different abnormal states which are 
reported as either full outages or as partial outages (deratings). 
As a result, the Equivalent Forced Outage Rate (EFOR) is a 
widely used measure of performance rather than the basic 
Forced Outage Rate (FOR). In current probabilistic reliability 
studies, these performance indices are assumed to be constant. 
If CMD outages are considered, these generation indices could 
possibly no longer be constant values depending on the health 
of the system and the limitations of repair resources [11]. 
In practice, important generation parameters, such as FOR 
and EFOR, are usually derived using statistical information of 
outage events over a specific period of time from generation 
data collection systems. It would be useful to know the nature 
of CMD outages if information on the portion of these outages 
among all forced outages could be found in a generation data 
collection system. 
GADS is the most important generation data collection sys-
tem used in the North American regions under the jurisdiction 
of NERC. In GADS, outage information for the majority of 
generators throughout the U.S. and Canada has been reported 
and maintained for years. It is, however, difficult to separate 
CMD outages from other outages, especially for internal-cause 
events. This is because GADS is designed to report data sepa-
rately for each generator. An outage event could be either inde-
pendent or CMD even for the same cause code. 
Nevertheless, two categories of outage events have been suc-
cessfully queried from GADS, both of which are identified as 
external CMD outages based on their cause codes. One cate-
gory is generation outage events that are related to transmission 
failures excluding power plant switchyard problems. The other 
category is generation outage events caused by catastrophes, 
which are mainly associated with extreme weather conditions 
or other natural disasters. The statistical information of these 
two outage categories for NERC units from 2012 to 2014 is 
shown in Tables IV and V. Table IV gives the percentage indi-
ces for the two categories of CMD outages based on all forced 
outages (including deratings) of NERC units.  
There are two indices in Table IV (i.e., percentage of occur-
rences and percentage of total MWh loss). The percentage of 
occurrences is an index without consideration of capacity. This 
index simply shows the portion of number of events for the 
CMD outages among all forced outages. Since capacity is an 
important factor for generators, outages (either full or partial) 
for generators with different capacities are obviously not the 
same. Thus, the percentage of total MWh loss is capacity 
weighted to address this concern. This index actually shows the 
portion of the impact of CMD outages among all forced out-
ages. 
It can be seen from Table IV that when all units are consid-
ered, the CMD outages cannot be simply neglected. If the num-
ber of outage events is considered, the transmission-related 
CMD outages could reach approximately 5% of the total occur-
rences. When outage consequences are considered, the catas-
trophe related CMD outages could contribute nearly 4% of the 
total impact. 
These data are consistent with the intuition that generator op-
eration can be influenced by failures of the transmission system 
and that catastrophes can be more harmful to operation than 
normal outages. Given that these two categories are only a part 
of all possible CMD outages collected in the GADS database, 
the percentage of all CMD outages can only be more significant 
in all forced outages using logical reasoning. 
In order to see the difference between various generation 
types, the percentage indices are also shown in Table IV for five 
different types of generators (i.e., fossil-steam, gas turbine, nu-
clear, hydro [including pumped storage], and combined-cycle 
reported as a block unit [CC-Block]). Data show that hydro and 
gas turbine units have much higher percentages of CMD out-
ages than other unit types, especially when transmission-related 
outages are considered. On the other hand, fossil-steam and nu-
clear units have relatively lower percentages. In general, fossil-
steam and nuclear units have slow output ramping rate and are 
mainly dispatched for the base load, while hydro and gas tur-
bine units have fast output ramping rate and carry more on the 
peak load of power systems. The observance of such CMD out-
age difference indicates that non-base-load generation units 
seem to be more vulnerable than base-load ones to transmission 
system problems, which might be associated with consideration 
of tolerable interruption level during the stage of interconnec-
tion design. 
Table V gives two non-percentage indices for the same cate-
gories of CMD outages, as well as all forced outages (including 
deratings) of NERC units from 2012 to 2014. The first index is 
the occurrences per unit year, which is one not weighted by ca-
pacity. This index is actually the statistical information of fre-
quency of CMD outages for a general unit. The second index is 
the MWh loss per occurrence, which is a capacity-weighted in-
dex. This index provides the duration of the CMD outage for a 
general unit. If this value is divided by the designated capacity 
of a unit, we can get the duration hours of the CMD outage for 
this unit. From the data, it is evident that hydro units have much 
less MWh loss per occurrence compared to other unit types. 
 
TABLE IV 
Percentage Indices for Common-Mode and 
Dependent Outages from GADS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unit Type Forced Outages/Deratings Percentage of Occurrences Percentage of Total MWh Loss
All Forced Outages/Deratings 100.00% 100.00%
Transmission related CMD 4.87% 1.98%
Catastrophe related CMD 1.48% 3.72%
All Forced Outages/Deratings 100.00% 100.00%
Transmission related CMD 0.74% 1.14%
Catastrophe related CMD 0.26% 0.89%
All Forced Outages/Deratings 100.00% 100.00%
Transmission related CMD 4.78% 3.19%
Catastrophe related CMD 1.30% 13.92%
All Forced Outages/Deratings 100.00% 100.00%
Transmission related CMD 0.60% 0.21%
Catastrophe related CMD 2.32% 1.43%
All Forced Outages/Deratings 100.00% 100.00%
Transmission related CMD 5.66% 3.51%
Catastrophe related CMD 1.45% 3.58%
All Forced Outages/Deratings 100.00% 100.00%
Transmission related CMD 1.55% 2.06%
Catastrophe related CMD 0.91% 5.50%
All Units
Fossil-
Steam
Gas 
Turbine
Nuclear
Hydro
CC_Block
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TABLE V 
Non-percentage Indices for Common-Mode and 
Dependent Outages from GADS 
 
 
V. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
This paper reviews state-of-the-art research and practical ap-
plications in the area of data collection, modeling, and assess-
ment of CMD outage events in power systems. Based on the 
review, several challenges and opportunities for future research 
have been observed, three of which that the WG considers im-
portant are detailed below. 
A. Enhancing the Collection Data Systems 
The review of existing outage data collection systems indi-
cates that a variety of outage-event recording procedures in use 
by electric utilities lack the complexity needed to record CMD 
outage events. 
CMD outages in current collection schemes are generally re-
ported without specifying what type of restoration process oc-
curred (automatic, manual, etc.). A more detail recording of the 
restoration process will permit calculation of meaningful resto-
ration-time related statistics. In traditional common-mode mod-
eling, a single repair (recovery) time is assumed. It has been 
observed in actual data collection, however, that the two or 
more components in a common-mode outage may have differ-
ent repair times in many cases.  
Difficulties still exist compiling the number of elements 
which were exposed to each event and the associated restoration 
times to determine the probability that an initiating outage will 
be of CMD outage type. 
Adverse weather conditions can create a significant increase 
in transmission element stress that usually leads to an increase 
in the component failure rates. Research shows that failure rates 
disaggregated by weather conditions are extremely difficult to 
obtain from existing data systems, such as TADS and GADS. 
Reporting weather at the time and place where an outage occurs 
will significantly enhance the accuracy of the estimates of reli-
ability indices. Recognition of only two weather states is an ap-
proximation, but gathering data for multi-states is extremely 
difficult.  
Substation-originated outages due to protection failures and 
misoperation have a significant impact on power system relia-
bility and therefore should be properly reported and classified. 
The reliability indices associated with the protection equipment 
operation are still difficult to obtain from actual reported data 
(e.g., failure and repair statistics, intervals between operating 
and testing, frequency of maintenance, etc.).  
Outage data on transmission and generation equipment are, 
in most cases, recorded separately, and there is an obvious dif-
ficulty in cross-referencing a single cause of simultaneous out-
ages of transmission and generation equipment.  
In general, the above issues present challenges on how to 
classify CMD outages, how to calculate their repair times, and 
how to calculate their indices according to the classed equip-
ment groups.  
Outage data systems are becoming an integral part of the 
planning and operation of utilities; therefore, the collection data 
systems need to be constantly improved. 
B. Improving Power System Models  
Traditional “bus-branch” models not longer satisfy the re-
quirements of probabilistic-type reliability calculations in mod-
ern power systems. The main disadvantage of these models is 
that basic bus-branch data ignore the substation breaker config-
uration and thus limit the assessment of the substation equip-
ment’s impact on system reliability.  
A better alternative is to use “node-breaker” representations, 
which are being increasingly used for reliability studies of mod-
ern systems with new technologies and variable energy re-
source integration. Introducing such models will help in the pre-
dictive reliability calculations but will require further research 
in this area.  
It also is important to recognize the advantages of explicit 
breaker-oriented system models in accounting for the impact of 
substation-originated outages which are related to the topology 
and switching actions inside the station. This approach is illus-
trated in detail in [34]-[36], and [53]. 
Further, assessing the impact of protection system failures 
and misoperations on system reliability requires “node-
breaker” models.  
Mathematical models developed to take into account weather 
dependency in general recognize two weather states. This is a 
simplification since adverse weather, for instance, can be char-
acterized by several conditions, such as wind speed, tempera-
ture, precipitation, ice accumulation and tornado, each of which 
could be of variable intensity. The effect of failure bunching 
due to adverse weather conditions has been studied but needs 
further research. 
Research is needed in the area of incorporating transmission 
and generation equipment aging failures in bulk power system 
reliability calculations and correlating expected reductions in 
the element performance on system reliability. 
There lacks a clear link between outage data collection prac-
tices and the methodologies for predicting system reliability in 
the future (which requires populating the models with appropri-
ate data). The lack of wide acceptance of probabilistic reliabil-
ity studies by industry is due to the fact that there are relatively 
few good, practical commercially available tools. However, the 
utility industry is moving in the direction of evaluating invest-
ments from risk and least-cost analyses. In order to fix the bro-
ken link between models and practical data collection regarding 
CMD outage events, extra effort is needed to re-examine the 
Unit Type Forced Outages/Deratings Occurrences per Unit Year MWh Loss per Occurrence
All Forced Outages/Deratings 9.31 4593
Transmission related CMD 0.46 1869
Catastrophe related CMD 0.14 11529
All Forced Outages/Deratings 33.58 4702
Transmission related CMD 0.25 7234
Catastrophe related CMD 0.09 16177
All Forced Outages/Deratings 4.93 3771
Transmission related CMD 0.24 2518
Catastrophe related CMD 0.06 40413
All Forced Outages/Deratings 7.25 52648
Transmission related CMD 0.04 18335
Catastrophe related CMD 0.17 32479
All Forced Outages/Deratings 16.75 1061
Transmission related CMD 0.95 658
Catastrophe related CMD 0.24 2625
All Forced Outages/Deratings 15.67 4234
Transmission related CMD 0.24 5608
Catastrophe related CMD 0.14 25572
Gas 
Turbine
Nuclear
Hydro
CC_Block
All Units
Fossil-
Steam
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standards, such as IEEE Std 762 and IEEE Std 859, and to re-
evaluate the existing outage data collection systems such as 
GADS and TADS. It is necessary to consider new definitions 
and indices that can accommodate the existence and relation-
ships of CMD events.  
C. Modeling of Interdependencies  
Review of the published work indicates that power system 
reliability does not solely depend on the infrastructure of the 
power grid, but it is also related to other infrastructures, such as 
communication networks, natural gas infrastructure, and smart 
grid technologies [54]. 
Models for incorporating protection system failures and their 
impact on composite power system reliability have been devel-
oped. However, due to the existence of new technologies and 
the complexity of cyber-physical interdependencies, it is chal-
lenging to evaluate the impact of protection failures on compo-
site system reliability. Understanding how the control and com-
munication systems of a power grid affect its reliability is a 
challenge for further research. Rapid developments in new tech-
nologies require a definite enhancement to the currently known 
models.  
Not modeling and evaluating interdependencies of various 
components and subsystems related to CMD events and func-
tional dependencies (e.g., protection misoperation, hidden fail-
ures) can provide misleading reliability results. 
In addition to power grid components, future research will 
require introducing and modeling other types of components, 
such as SCADA, so the impacts from cyber attacks can be eval-
uated. 
D. Uncertainty Quantification in Risk Model Outputs 
A fundamental part of any applied statistical study is placing 
uncertainty bounds on estimates – there is a great difference if 
a central estimate of a quantity (say LOLE) being 1 and between 
having confidence that the true value lies between 0.9 and 1.01, 
and believing that it could lie anywhere between 0.1 and 10. 
General methods exist for making such uncertainty quantifica-
tions – see e.g. [55] for methods in a reliability context, and [56] 
for resources on comprehensive uncertainty quantification ap-
plicable to a broad class of computer models. 
There has been little research on uncertainty quantification in 
power system reliability model outputs. Section 2.9 of [1], and 
[57] consider uncertainty in generator availability properties, 
while [58] considers consequences of sparse component failure 
data. Increased activity in this area would bring great potential 
benefits to the industry in practical decision making. 
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